

Disrupting Drug Markets

The policies and programs of the *National Drug Control Strategy* are guided by the fundamental insight that the illegal drug trade is a market, and both users and traffickers are affected by market dynamics. By disrupting this market, the US Government seeks to undermine the ability of drug suppliers to meet, expand, and profit from drug demand. When drug supply does not fully meet drug demand, changes in drug price and purity support prevention efforts by making initiation to drug use more difficult. They also contribute to treatment efforts by eroding the abilities of users to sustain their habits.

An increasingly diverse body of scientific evidence underscores the significance of drug price and purity to the habits of drug users. Youth surveys have demonstrated the strong inverse relationship between cocaine use and price. Emergency department admissions data and arrestee urinalysis results for both cocaine and heroin also reveal a strong correlation between use and price. Additional studies indicate that decreases in heroin purity and increases in heroin price are linked to increases in methadone program enrollments and dose requirements. The sensitivity of users to drug price and purity is a durable relationship that can be influenced to help achieve America's national drug control goals.

Drug control programs focused on market disruption attempt to reduce the profits and raise the risks involved in drug trafficking. The desired result is a reduced incentive for traffickers or would-be traffickers to enter or remain in the illicit trade. Moreover, these programs generate and exacerbate the challenges involved in the drug trade by forcing traffickers to take additional steps, identify new accomplices, and choose new methods of operation that increase the cost, risk, and complexity of smuggling drugs. The US Government and its international partners focus on eradicating drug crops, interdicting drug production and movement, and attacking

drug trafficking organizations with support from critical information and intelligence activities.

Combining these drug control tools into effective market-disruption campaigns requires an understanding of the operation and organization of illicit drug markets. Applying concepts used to analyze legal markets can be helpful. Similar to many lawful agricultural industries, the illicit drug industry is composed of business sectors focused on functions such as cultivation, production, transportation, distribution, and finance. Damaging these large business sectors often requires a deliberate and extended application of resources to overcome the resilience generated by multiple organizations operating in a single functional area.

Sometimes market disruptions can be achieved by rolling up trafficking organizations operating within a particular business sector. For example, law enforcement efforts targeting major Colombian cocaine transporters in 1999 resulted in the disruption of organizations responsible for smuggling 20–30 tons of cocaine each month. The dramatic impact of similar initiatives focused on major Dutch MDMA (Ecstasy) transporters is reflected in the 80 percent decline in US seizures of Ecstasy tablets shipped from abroad from 2001 to 2004. In other instances, eliminating a critical element of a business sector may be more effective. For example, between 1995 and 1999, the Peruvian coca cultivation sector was devastated by the interdiction of airplanes carrying coca to Colombia for processing into cocaine.

The illicit drug industry can also be viewed as a series of segments in a supply chain extending from fields abroad to streets at home. This segmented market view is based on the transfer of drug ownership from one organization to another in each segment. In the past, a single drug cartel owned the drug that it trafficked from its cultivation and production all the way to its wholesale distribution. Now, many large trafficking organizations specialize in specific segments of the supply chain, such as cultivation, production, transportation from source country to US border areas, and smuggling across the border into the

United States. By participating in only one market segment, traffickers can concentrate their expertise and connections while limiting their overall risk.


This segmented market view is perhaps most relevant to the cocaine industry, where unified Colombian cartels have been replaced by looser networks of Colombian and Mexican trafficking organizations. Separate Colombian organizations may handle the cultivation, production, and initial offshore movement segments of the cocaine supply chain. Mexican organizations then coordinate the remaining transportation and distribution segments required for the cocaine to reach US streets. In each exchange between traffickers, ownership of the product is transferred in a manner that ensures that the supplier will be compensated regardless of the final disposition of the cocaine.

The characteristics of each market segment enable us to identify areas where our market disruption resources can be used most effectively. Returning to the cocaine industry example, an analysis of the initial offshore movement segment of the cocaine supply chain reveals ample opportunities for market disruption. Colombian cocaine transporters must make arrangements for coastal departure points, suitable speedboats and fishing vessels, and the requisite crews and fuel. They must also coordinate drug storage, refueling, and product exchange. These unique skills take time and effort to replace when successful interdiction and investigation initiatives remove these transporters from the supply chain.

Armed with a better understanding of the different market segments, the United States can strategically target vulnerabilities and optimize impact on the market. Relatively short-term disruptions of drug markets caused by events such as the removal of a key drug trafficker can lead to significant challenges in the drug trade because of the importance of relationships and routines. However, combining sustained, focused operations on drug-market segments can yield more substantial changes in drug availability, price, and purity that support the reductions in drug use that are the ultimate goal of the *National Drug Control Strategy*.

We are beginning to see the results of our market disruption strategy in the United States. Cocaine price and purity at the retail level have reversed a three year trend of increasing purity and decreasing price. Continued declines in the potential production of cocaine in South America and record worldwide cocaine seizures have gradually reduced global supply. Worldwide seizures of cocaine, for example, reached record levels of more than 400 metric tons annually in 2003 and 2004. These unprecedented removals of cocaine from global distribution, combined with the diminished ability of the source countries to replenish worldwide supply, is beginning to have an effect in the United States. Between February and September 2005, retail cocaine purity dropped by 15 percent. Retail cocaine prices increased during the same period, suggesting the beginnings of a disruption of the cocaine market.

Not only are we now seeing positive changes in the domestic cocaine market, we are also achieving results with heroin. Expanded aerial eradication efforts, supported by the State Department's airwing, have inflicted substantial damage to the Colombian opium poppy cultivation sector, leading to a 68 percent reduction in cultivation from 2001 to 2004. Upgraded security screening at US airports has led to increased seizures of Colombian heroin, from 15 percent of available heroin in 2001 to 23 percent of available heroin in 2002. (Available heroin is the net amount of heroin available to the United



States; it is Colombian potential production of heroin less the seizures of heroin in Colombia.) As a result of these and many other law enforcement efforts, the retail purity of Colombian heroin dropped by 22 percent, and the retail price increased by 33 percent from 2003 to 2004.

Regardless of the time and expense involved, market disruption yields several additional benefits. It contributes to the Global War on Terrorism, severing the links between drug traffickers and terrorist organizations in countries such as Afghanistan and Colombia, among others. It renders support to allies such as the courageous administration of President Alvaro Uribe in Colombia. Market disruption initiatives remove some of the most violent criminals from society, from kingpins such as the remnants of the Cali Cartel to common thugs such as the vicious MS-13 street gang. This Strategy outlines how the efforts of the United States and its allies are working to disrupt the drug markets that threaten our society while furthering broader goals both at home and abroad.

Progress in the Andean Ridge

The Andean Ridge is the sole supplier of the world's cocaine and a provider of the heroin consumed in the United States. Although Colombia is the predominant source of both illicit drugs, any plan targeting cocaine and heroin production must consider the latent capacity within Bolivia and Peru. Drug production and trafficking in Ecuador and Venezuela must also be considered. The Administration's Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) addresses all of these concerns and is yielding promising results. President Uribe and the Government of Colombia are firmly committed to countering the threat that drug trafficking poses to Colombia, the Western Hemisphere, and the world. Colombia and the United States are solid partners in a combined strategy of eradication, interdiction, and organizational attack.

In 2004, Colombia sprayed more than 131,000 hectares of coca and manually eradicated another 10,279 hectares. The Government of Colombia reported spraying more

Changes in Retail Price and Purity of Cocaine


Starting in February 2005, retail-level cocaine price and purity showed evidence of reversing a three-year trend of increasing purity and decreasing prices. An analysis of retail cocaine samples showed that between February and September 2005 (the last month for which data are available), cocaine purity declined 15 percent, whereas price per pure gram increased 19 percent.

The trend reversal reflects successes in our overseas-market disruption strategy. Potential production of cocaine in South America has declined steadily since 2001, and worldwide cocaine seizures reached record levels in the past four years. Moreover, no "balloon effect" has occurred in Bolivian and Peruvian cultivation that would offset the dramatic year-over-year decreases in Colombia. In short, our overseas counterdrug efforts have slowly constricted the pipeline that brings cocaine to the United States.

Retail price and purity data are just now showing the effects of our supply-side successes, partly because there is a lag between when

leaf is harvested in Colombia and a US retail sample is collected and analyzed by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). Retail-level cocaine is not necessarily ingested by an addict in the same year that its source coca plant was grown and harvested. In Colombia, for example, coca leaf must be harvested, processed into base, transported to a cocaine hydrochloride (HCl) lab, refined into HCl, smuggled to staging areas on the Colombian coast, transported and staged at multiple points in the transit zone, smuggled into the United States, sold to a US-based wholesale trafficker, distributed to a retail organization, and sold on the street at the drug's final destination. Although difficult to assess, analysts believe this lag could be anywhere from 9 to 24 months, depending on a host of variables.


Cocaine demand is also a critical variable when measuring drug availability and the effects of our overseas-market disruption efforts. The most recent data from the National Survey of Drug Use and Health (NSDUH), a representative sample of more than 95 percent of the population 12 years of age and older, show reduced past-year consumption of crack cocaine between 2002 and 2004. Our supply-side constriction of US-bound cocaine appears to have now outpaced the decline in demand, and we are witnessing the early stages of a change in cocaine availability.



than 138,000 hectares of coca and manually eradicating more than 31,000 hectares in 2005. These efforts have reduced cultivation by one-third since 2001 and reduced potential pure cocaine production from 700 metric tons in 2001 to 430 metric tons in 2004.

Although substantial progress has been made in eradication, tactics must continually be adjusted as traffickers try to adapt to the Government of Colombia's massive eradication campaign (see *Increasing Colombian Coca Aerial Eradication*). In fact, the shrinking and dispersal of coca fields, the systematic use of seedbeds, and countermeasures designed to make plots harder to find from the air may require additional spray planes to continue to reduce Colombian coca production. It has already required increased aerial spray and manual eradication operations. The Department of State has received authorization to spend \$30 million in FY 2006 to buy and refurbish spray aircraft for Colombia under the Critical Flight Safety Program. The State Department will receive additional funding in FY 2007 to continue this crucial safety upgrade that will bolster a much-needed aerial eradication capability in Colombia.

Reports from the field indicate that the narcotraffickers are focusing their cultivation efforts in areas that are difficult to identify from the air because of bad weather, such as Nariño. With that in mind, the Government of Colombia, with our assistance, began additional spray



operations late last year in Nariño and increased manual eradication operations in eastern Colombia and the national parks where additional, previously undetected coca has been planted.

The attack on opium poppy has been just as relentless (see *Decline of Potential Production of Pure Colombian Heroin*). In 2004, Colombia sprayed 3,060 hectares of poppy and manually eradicated another 1,253. In 2005, Colombia sprayed more than 1,600 hectares of poppy and manually eradicated 496 hectares. Poppy cultivation has decreased by two-thirds since 2001, and potential pure heroin production decreased to 3.8 metric tons from 11.4 metric tons in 2001. These efforts have contributed greatly to the significant reductions in heroin purity that has taken place in the United States over the past two years.

Colombia is also aggressively pursuing the movement of illicit drugs throughout its national territory and is seizing record quantities of cocaine, coca base, heroin, and precursor chemicals. Contributing to Colombia's success has been the Air Bridge Denial program. In 2005, this program resulted in seven interdictions, five impounded aircraft, the destruction of two aircraft, and the seizure of 1.5 metric tons of cocaine in Colombia. Additionally, three aircraft and 2.1 metric tons of cocaine were impounded in neighboring countries after coordination between host nations and JIATF-South. In 2004, the

program resulted in the destruction of 13 aircraft, damage to one aircraft, and impounding three aircraft.

Colombian security forces, reaping the benefits of US law enforcement training and assistance, report the seizure of more than 200 metric tons of cocaine and coca base in 2005—setting an impressive single-year record. Additionally, security forces destroyed more than 130 cocaine HCl labs, preventing a significant amount of cocaine from being produced. In one significant operation in May 2005, Counternarcotics Police and Navy personnel captured 15 metric tons of cocaine along the Mira River in southern Nariño. The cocaine was packaged and ready to be loaded onto several trafficker speedboats that would have moved it through the eastern Pacific to eventual delivery points along the Mexican-Central American corridor.

Interdiction programs have benefited from the Government of Colombia's commitment to extend its presence and establish the rule of law throughout the country. This has restricted the movement of narcotrafickers and denied them operating space. By the end of 2005, public security forces such as the High Mountain

Battalions and the Mobile Brigades will have grown from 1 to 7 and from 7 to 15, respectively. Additionally, 54 rural police (Carabineros) squadrons were in place by the end of 2005, up from 25 squadrons in 2002. Furthermore, for the first time in history, all 1,098 Colombian municipalities have a National Police presence.

Finally, the Colombian military has continued implementation of its Plan Patriota (Plan Patriot) in the south-central part of the country—the general area of what was formerly a Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) demilitarized zone. This operation has reduced the number of transportation corridors that the FARC used to move illicit drugs from the growing areas to the coast. This successful disruption of the transportation of illicit drugs has diminished the FARC's income from drugs over the past year. It also weakened a vicious terrorist organization that for decades attempted to violently overthrow Colombia's democratically elected government.

The commitment of the Government of Colombia to attack powerful drug traffickers and extradite them to the United States is unparalleled (see *Extraditions From Colombia*). In 2005, Colombia extradited several key

Extraditions From Colombia in 2005

EXTRADITIONS BY YEARS	12/97 to 12/99*	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	Totals since 12/97
Colombian Nationals Extradited	1*	11	23	37	64	88	131	355
Non-Colombian Nationals Extradited	8* (Cuba, Argentina, Panama, US, Venezuela)	2 (Ecuador, Argentina)	3 (Cuba, US/Cuba, US)	3 (Italy, Ecuador, US)	4 (Chile, Lebanon, Cuba, Ecuador)	3 (Honduras, Ecuador)	3 (Venez., Bahamas, Iran)	26
Total Extradited from Colombia	9	13	26	40	68	91	134	381

* The Colombian Constitution was amended December 17, 1997, to allow the extradition of Colombian nationals. The first Colombian national was extradited to the U.S. November 21, 1999; 7 non-Colombians were extradited to the U.S. between December 17, 1997 and November 21, 1999. This chart was amended as of 6/4/04 by starting the statistical calculations from December 17, 1997, given that statistics are often provided from this date forward in documents, speeches, etc.

narcotraffickers, including a former Consolidated Priority Organizations Target (CPOT), Elias Cobos Muñoz; FARC logistics leader, Omaira Rojas Cabrera; and former head of the Cali Cartel, Miguel Rodríguez Orejuela. In December 2004, the Government of Colombia extradited the other Cali Cartel leader, Gilberto Rodríguez Orejuela, as well as a key FARC leader, Ricardo Palmera.

Colombia has also been aggressive in attacking the three designated foreign terrorist organizations in Colombia—the FARC, the United Self-Defense Forces/Group of Colombia (AUC), and the National Liberation Army (ELN)—which are all deeply involved in drug trafficking. However, President Uribe has also been willing to engage in a peace process with any terrorist organization that is willing to end violence and negotiate a peace agreement. In July 2005, Uribe signed the Justice and Peace Law, designed to provide the framework for members of the illegal armed groups to demobilize and reenter Colombian society. It is intended to apply to all illegal armed groups including the FARC and the ELN, as well as the AUC, if they also enter a peace process. The AUC entered into a cease-fire agreement with the government in 2003 and began demobilizing its organization. More than 20,000 AUC personnel had demobilized collectively as of January 31, 2006. The ELN has been engaged in exploratory talks concerning a possible peace process with the Colombian Government.

The United States and Colombia must work to secure and extend the success of the Andean Counterdrug Initiative and Plan Colombia by aggressively countering trafficker responses to the success of ongoing eradication, interdiction, and organizational attack programs. Increased aerial eradication capability is necessary to attack replanting efforts more swiftly. Additional focus must be placed on identifying new cultivation of coca and opium poppy, particularly in more remote areas. The United States will also support Colombia in coordinated efforts to increase interdiction pressure against drug-movement corridors within Colombia and to target the most vulnerable segments of the Colombian supply chain through organizational attack.

Peru and Bolivia remain the second and third largest producers of cocaine, with Peru producing 145 metric tons and Bolivia some 70 metric tons of pure cocaine in 2004. The United States has been and, to the extent possible, intends to continue working with these two countries in eventually reducing their illicit coca cultivation while creating an inhospitable environment for those considering reentry into cultivation, cocaine production, and transportation of the illicit product.

These countries continue to eradicate coca, attacking its spread into new areas. Both Peru and Bolivia have pressed their eradication campaigns in the face of organized opposition, and their success is evident by the strident objections and attempts to derail the eradication efforts by narcotrafficker groups.

Peru and Bolivia are interdicting record levels of cocaine and precursor chemicals in the traditional growing areas, creating logistical jams in the pipeline from the coca field to the HCl lab. Finally, these governments have been creating an environment that respects the rule of law by increasing the number of counterdrug prosecutors, developing laws that punish the white-collar dimensions of narcotrafficking (such as money laundering), and improving the efficiency of police units. The United States will work with Peru and Bolivia in these efforts as part of the broader Andean Counterdrug Initiative to ensure that drug trafficking does not experience a resurgence in these countries.

Targeting Methamphetamine and Other Synthetics

Since the early 1990s, and especially over the past few years, the illicit use of synthetic drugs such as methamphetamine and otherwise-legal prescription drugs has become a severe and troubling problem, both at the national level and in affected communities. The most devastating of these synthetic drugs has been methamphetamine, but in some areas, so-called club drugs such as Ecstasy have also become a major concern. The abuse of prescription drugs, including OxyContin (oxycodone), has become the second most prevalent form of drug abuse.

In response to these developments, in October 2004, the Federal Government released the *National Synthetic Drugs Action Plan*, the first comprehensive national plan to

address the problems of synthetic and pharmaceutical drug trafficking and abuse. The Action Plan outlines current Federal and state efforts in the areas of prevention, treatment, regulation, and law enforcement and made concrete recommendations for enhancing government efforts to reduce synthetic drug abuse. These efforts will be outlined in a separate document that will describe the Administration's plan for affecting the illicit market for synthetic drugs during the next 24 months.

Attacking the Domestic Methamphetamine and Precursor Threat

In the past decade and a half, methamphetamine use has gradually spread eastward across the United States. Between 1992 and 2002, the treatment admission rate for methamphetamine/amphetamine has increased from 10 to 52 admissions per 100,000 population age 12 or older (an

Disruption of the Colombian Heroin Market

Over the past several years, a significant disruption has occurred in the heroin market. Retail prices have increased by one-third, while retail purity has dropped 22 percent in one year. This outcome is the result of significant operations, both at home and abroad.



With the aid of the United States, the Colombian Government has redoubled its efforts in eradication and interdiction, making the cultivation of opium poppies and trafficking of heroin far more risky than the monetary reward. This has increasingly discouraged farmers from planting opium poppy; poppy cultivation declined by 68 percent from 2001 to 2004.

Law enforcement agencies in several US cities have dismantled major heroin organizations that controlled the domestic trafficking, distribution, and production (cutting and packaging) of heroin. Taking down these organizations has led to a noticeable

decline in the availability of heroin in New York City and record-low purities in Chicago. Increased US airport security has also resulted in increased drug seizures, primarily of Colombian heroin. In 2001, based on percentages from the Heroin Signature Program, 15 percent of the estimated available Colombian heroin was seized. In 2002, 2.2 metric tons of Colombian heroin were seized in the United States, about 23 percent of the estimated available Colombian heroin. This trend continued in 2003 and 2004, with US seizures of 26 percent and more than 29 percent of the available Colombian heroin, respectively.

The resulting shortfall in the supply of Colombian heroin has led to a decline in use. Heroin-treatment admissions reflect this decline. Admissions for heroin use reached a peak in 2002, with 289,056 recorded entries. Entries into treatment institutions declined in the following years, to 272,815 in 2003 (a 6 percent decrease from 2002) and an estimated 254,181 in 2004 (a 12 percent decrease from 2002). This data represents a summation of 2004 state data from Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration's Treatment Episode Data Set.


Although more work needs to be done, the combination of eradication, interdiction, and organizational attack has seriously disrupted the Colombian heroin market.

increase of over 500 percent). Additionally, between 2000 and 2004, the positive drug-testing rates among the general US workforce for methamphetamine/amphetamine increased from 0.25 percent to 0.52 percent of all tests (an increase of more than 200 percent). Although the spread of methamphetamine use is troubling, there is a significant bright spot in youth use rates since the President took office. Methamphetamine use rates have dropped by almost one-third among 8th, 10th and 12th graders since 2001 (as addressed in the Introduction).

In response to the increased threat from methamphetamine, US law enforcement agencies have increased their efforts both domestically and internationally to stem the flow of methamphetamine and the precursors that are used to produce it. States have also taken decisive action with dramatic results. Within the past year, 35 states have passed legislation to impose new regulations on the retail sale of the methamphetamine precursor pseudoephedrine. Because the challenges vary from state to state, these restrictions vary by state in their severity and content. States with the strictest pseudoephedrine laws have seen significant reductions in the seizure of small toxic labs. For example, 662 labs were seized in Oklahoma in 2003 (see *Reduced Methamphetamine Lab Seizures in Oklahoma*). After instituting strict laws controlling pseudoephedrine in March 2004, lab seizures in Oklahoma dropped by 38 percent to 409 labs in 2004, and only 62 labs were reported seized in Oklahoma during the first six months


of 2005. Iowa has had similar results, with 503 labs seized in 2003, 463 labs seized in 2004 (an 8 percent drop), and only 120 reported labs seized during the first six months of 2005 (see *Reduced Methamphetamine Lab Seizures in Iowa*). As other states have adopted similar restrictions, methamphetamine lab seizures have declined nationally, with 10,182 lab seizures in 2003 to 9,851 lab seizures in 2004. Additionally, the number of seized “superlabs” (labs capable of producing more than 10 pounds of methamphetamine per production run) has declined from 245 in 2001 to 55 in 2004—a 77 percent decrease (see *Reduced Methamphetamine Superlab Seizures*).

Reduced Methamphetamine Lab Seizures in Iowa




Source: Based on Clandestine Laboratory Seizure System (CLSS), extracted 11/20/05.

Reduced Methamphetamine Lab Seizures in Oklahoma



Source: Based on Clandestine Laboratory Seizure System (CLSS), extracted 11/20/05.

Reduced Methamphetamine Superlab Seizures



Source: Based on Clandestine Laboratory Seizure System (CLSS), extracted 11/20/05.

Federal efforts have also had a dramatic effect on the fight against methamphetamine. ONDCP's High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) program has 96 initiatives that are specifically focused on methamphetamine—the largest number of initiatives focused on any single drug. In addition, DEA has taken steps to counter the methamphetamine threat. In 2005, DEA streamlined its Mobile Enforcement Teams (MET) program, which provides investigative support to state and local authori-

ties, and focused it on methamphetamine trafficking. DEA also conducted Operation Wildfire, a sweep operation conducted with state and local law enforcement partners in more than 200 cities across the United States that resulted in 427 arrests and the seizure of more than 208 pounds of methamphetamine. Additional Operation Wildfire seizures included 56 clandestine methamphetamine laboratories, more than 200,000 pseudoephedrine tablets, 300 pounds of pseudoephedrine powder, more

Dutch-US Cooperation and Collapse of MDMA Market

Five years ago, the United States saw a sharply escalating pattern of MDMA trafficking. Starting with the dance/rave scene, MDMA pills appeared to be an emerging epidemic. At its peak in 2001, total domestic seizures of MDMA reached 11 million tablets. In the past 2 years, however, total domestic seizures declined to less than 3 million tablets. Seizures of MDMA tablets shipped from abroad also dropped from around 7 million tablets in 2001 to less than 1.5 million tablets in 2003 and 2004. The dramatic decline in this drug market is reflected in the 40 percent decline in past-year users age 12 and older between 2002 and 2004.



Part of this success is the result of increased counternarcotics cooperation between the United States and the Netherlands. Joint investigations revealed that MDMA coming into the United States was primarily produced in the Netherlands. In response, US and Dutch law enforcement agencies have increased efforts to identify, investigate, and prosecute domestic and international criminal organizations engaged in the production, distribution, and transportation of MDMA. One example of this collaborative approach is *Operation Double Dutch*, in which US and Dutch customs agents used risk analysis techniques to successfully target suspicious cargo departing from Schiphol Airport in 2004 and 2005. US and Dutch authorities also conducted *Operation Mercure* to target MDMA mailed from the Netherlands to the United States in 2002. Moreover, the Netherlands and the United States have assumed leading roles in Project Prism, the United Nations International Narcotic Control Board's effort to limit international diversion of chemicals that can be used to produce MDMA and other illegal drugs.

The Netherlands has made several changes in its domestic efforts against MDMA trafficking. Five years ago the Dutch Government released a new strategy against the production, trade, and consumption of synthetic drugs and expanded the Dutch Police Synthetic Drugs Unit. Over the past several years, the Dutch have established five regional MDMA teams of 120 police officers and have increased the number of inspectors at Schiphol Airport examining airfreight to determine which cargoes are at risk of containing drugs. Dutch law enforcement authorities have expanded customs efforts, increased their capacity to dismantle laboratories, and intensified controls on chemical precursors. Authorities have successfully prosecuted cases against some of the most significant transnational crime groups engaged in the MDMA trade, effectively dismantling the leadership structures of these criminal organizations. The Dutch Government has entered into new treaties to expand the legal basis for cross-border law enforcement cooperation with its neighboring states, and joint operations with international law enforcement agencies have increased substantially. As a result of these various efforts, Dutch MDMA seizures increased from 3.6 million tablets in 2001 to an average of 5.5 million tablets a year for 2003 and 2004.

The United States has taken several significant steps to improve its own domestic efforts against MDMA trafficking. The Department of Homeland Security's Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement established the National Ecstasy Task Force to serve as a command and control center for coordinating MDMA interdiction and investigation efforts and to collect actionable intelligence on developing patterns and trends for dissemination to the field. Since 2001, the Source Determination Program at the DEA Special Testing Laboratory has produced a club-drug monthly report that provides information on seizures nationwide, tracks ballistics, describes tablet monograms and other physical characteristics, and identifies current and past cases from illicit tableting sources. Recent enforcement initiatives, such as DEA's *Operation Sweet Tooth*, target organizations that distribute MDMA. *Operation Sweet Tooth* resulted in the dismantlement of two foreign-based MDMA trafficking organizations that distributed the drug in 36 cities in the United States.

than 224,000 ephedrine tablets, 123 weapons, 28 vehicles, and \$255,000 in US currency. Further, 30 drug-endangered children (DEC) were removed from methamphetamine-contaminated environments.

Decreasing the number of domestic labs not only reduces methamphetamine production and the environmental damage caused by the production process but also reduces the threat that these labs pose to families and children. According to the El Paso Intelligence Center, 14,260 methamphetamine lab-related incidents occurred during calendar year 2003. At 1,442 of the lab incidents during FY 2003, at least one child was present. The labs affected more than 3,000 children, including children who were residing at the labs but may not have been present at the time of the seizure and children who were visiting the site. Nearly 1,300 incidents involved a child being exposed to toxic chemicals.

In October 2003, ONDCP launched a national DEC initiative to assist with coordination among existing state programs that help rehabilitate children who have been affected by methamphetamine. The initiative also created a standardized training program to extend programming to states where such initiatives do not yet exist. Previously, the Department of Justice's Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) awarded \$2,124,000 to be used for programs helping children as part of the COPS Methamphetamine Initiative.

Attacking International Methamphetamine and Precursor Threats


Although a great deal of law enforcement resources have been dedicated to fighting the spread of methamphetamine domestically, much of the success in disrupting the methamphetamine market will continue to rely on our ability to work with other countries to reduce the flow of methamphetamine and its precursors—principally pseudoephedrine and ephedrine—into the United States.

Over the past few years, increasing production of methamphetamine within Mexico has been indicated by


increased seizures at the US southwest border (see *Increased Southwest Border Methamphetamine Seizures*), reports of additional methamphetamine lab seizures within Mexico, and reports from state and local law enforcement throughout the United States concerning the influx of out-of-state methamphetamine within their jurisdictions. Although this is a significant and growing threat, Mexico has taken some important steps.

Through its Federal Commission for the Protection Against Sanitary Risks (COFEPRIS), Mexico is implementing several important wholesale and retail controls on pseudoephedrine in cooperation with the pharmaceutical industry and is considering others. In addition, Mexico recently imposed a policy limiting imports of pseudoephedrine and ephedrine to manufacturers only. Wholesale distributors are barred from importing raw pseudoephedrine and ephedrine. Furthermore, importers can import shipments of no more than 3,000 kilograms at a time. Mexico also has begun imposing import quotas tied to estimates of national needs after a study revealed a significant excess of pseudoephedrine imports over Mexico's estimated lawful needs.

With US support, Mexico is training and equipping methamphetamine-focused law enforcement teams to combat the spread of methamphetamine production in Mexico. DEA is providing laboratory cleanup and investigation training for Mexican law enforcement elements.




2004 U.S. Imports of Pseudoephedrine Powder



Source: Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)

2004 U.S. Imports of Ephedrine Powder



Source: Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)

These teams have already identified and destroyed several large methamphetamine laboratories and many small-scale labs. Additionally, Mexican authorities have seized nearly 50 million methamphetamine precursor pills since December 2000.

Canada, like Mexico, is aiding us in the fight against trafficking and diversion. Canada has taken numerous steps over the past few years to prevent the diversion of pseudoephedrine and ephedrine through increased control of imports and exports. From 2000 to 2004, lawful pseudoephedrine imports into Canada fell from just over 500 to less than 50 metric tons. Additionally, from 2003 to 2004, lawful ephedrine imports fell from 19 to 7 metric tons, and overall pseudoephedrine and methamphetamine seizures have dropped over the past year. These reduced precursor imports into Canada resulted in sharp declines in the amounts of pseudoephedrine and ephedrine diverted into the United States for the manufacture of methamphetamine.

In addition to working with Mexico and Canada on this issue, the United States continues to work with the primary producing and exporting countries for bulk ephedrine and pseudoephedrine—China, the Czech Republic, Germany, and India (see *Foreign Sources of Methamphetamine Precursors*). The United States is also collaborating with the wider international community to reach arrangements that will impede the diversion of these

precursors to methamphetamine labs. For example, the DEA and its Mexican counterparts recently obtained a commitment from Hong Kong not to ship chemicals to the United States, Mexico, or Panama until receiving an import permit or equivalent documentation and notifying the receiving country.

The United States is very interested in reaching these types of prenotification agreements with India and China, as well for all shipment of pseudoephedrine and ephedrine regardless of destination country. This type of export transparency is solely intended to reduce diversion and illicit demand for both products. The United States and Mexico are also working to gain broader international support for prenotification of international shipments of combination tablets containing pseudoephedrine through multilateral bodies such as the Organization of American States and the Project Prism initiative convened by the United Nations International Narcotics Control Board.

Reducing Prescription Drug Abuse

The rise in the nonmedical use of prescription drugs listed as controlled substances has created a new challenge not only for traditional organizations involved in reducing drug use (e.g., law enforcement, treatment providers, and prevention specialists) but also for the medical and pharmaceutical community. The nature of this problem poses

the deceptively simple question: How do individuals who abuse prescription drugs get them? Data of this sort are hard to obtain, but experience suggests that it largely occurs in six ways (in no particular order): illegal purchases without a prescription over the Internet; so-called doctor shopping; theft or other diversion directly from pharmacies; unscrupulous doctors who—knowingly at worst, carelessly at best—overprescribe medications; traditional street-level drug dealing; and receiving prescription drugs for no cost from family and friends. The illegal use of pharmaceuticals is one of the fastest growing forms of drug abuse.

The Administration's strategy in this area focuses on preventing diversion and getting users into treatment where necessary. For example, one of the programs meeting with some success at the state level is the prescription-drug monitoring program (PDMP), which helps provide doctors, pharmacists, and, when appropriate, law enforcement with information about patient prescriptions. As of October 2005, a total of 25 states have operational PDMPs or are in the process of implementing them. To give a specific example of where PDMPs can help, an individual struggling with an addiction to Vicodin might go to five doctors to complain of back pain and receive five separate prescriptions for the drug, which could then be filled at five separate pharmacies. States with PDMPs help prevent doctors and pharmacists from becoming unwitting accessories to the abuse of these prescription drugs by showing information on other prescriptions given to, or filled by, the individual within the preceding weeks or months. In addition, identifying the abuser can help medical professionals recommend appropriate treatment.

PDMPs assist states in identifying diversion trends as they emerge. Analysis of PDMP data assists law enforcement in the identification of doctor shoppers and overprescribers. In addition, the information collected and analyzed by a state PDMP may be used to assist in identifying patients whose drug usage is increasing and who may benefit from a referral for treatment, to assist health care professionals in making appropriate treatment decisions for their patients, and to assist pharmacists in providing appropriate pharmaceutical care.

In 2003, Virginia implemented a limited PDMP in the southwestern portion of the state to address the growing abuse of oxycodone and other prescription drugs. Virginia's limited PDMP monitored schedule II controlled substances in one state-defined health district. The database now contains close to 500,000 prescriptions, and more than 1,000 requests for data have been processed. Virginia's limited PDMP was so successful in addressing diversion that legislation was passed in 2005 to extend the program to the entire state beginning in FY 2006. The program will capture data for all schedule II-IV prescriptions.

One of the Nation's flagship PDMPs is Kentucky's All Schedules Prescription Electronic Reporting program, or KASPER. The program is fully electronic. Within 16 days of filling a prescription, pharmacists must input the information into the KASPER database. KASPER covers drugs listed under schedules II-V. Physicians may request patient information from the KASPER system. Law enforcement agencies can receive information from KASPER for an active investigation. The KASPER system is entirely web based. During this past legislative session, Kentucky's PDMP received approval to bring in an expert consultant to focus on enhancing the data-collection side of the program. The goal was to make the entire system operate in real time.

Meanwhile, another source of prescription-drug diversion is the Internet, which is populated with thousands of sites that offer pharmaceutical controlled substances. Some Internet pharmacies operate within the law and accepted medical practice, providing a valuable service to consumers with a legitimate medical need for prescription drugs. However, the DEA has investigated cases where unscrupulous doctors have operated "pill mills" that essentially sell prescriptions or drugs after cursory or nonexistent medical examinations, sometimes making use of pharmaceuticals that have been smuggled into the United States.

The problem, of course, is one of safety and effectiveness: otherwise-legal prescription drugs can be distributed over the Internet with no medical exam, tests, or follow-up care

and no guarantees of safety and effectiveness or assurance of safe handling, storage, or shipping.

In response to this challenge, DEA will continue to work closely with the FDA to identify, investigate, and target online pharmacies operating outside the bounds of the law and legitimate medical practice. For example, in 2005, DEA announced the culmination of *Operation CYBERx*, an investigation that targeted major alleged pharmaceutical drug traffickers. The ringleaders of this group are believed to have operated more than 4,600 rogue Internet pharmacy websites, shipping prescription drugs—without a prescription—to the doors of many US citizens. To further assist in the identification and targeting of these rogue websites, DEA launched a toll-free international hotline (1-877-RX-ABUSE) for anonymous reporting on the illegal sale and abuse of controlled substances.

Intelligence and Organizational Attack

Effective implementation of the Nation's market disruption strategy poses new challenges for law enforcement and foreign intelligence capabilities. Market disruption requires a broad understanding of the global operations of the illicit-drug industry, from cultivation and production through transportation and distribution until it is marketed and consumed. Our counterdrug intelligence system can assist the market disruption effort in three critical ways. First, counterdrug intelligence can help identify the structure and components of the drug market and collect information in support of law enforcement efforts to attack and disrupt the market. Second, intelligence helps US Government officials locate strategic vulnerabilities within various drug markets that can be targeted by counterdrug initiatives. Third, counterdrug intelligence provides critical information to help US officials evaluate the success of counterdrug programs that target drug markets. Real-time detailed information about market indicators helps counterdrug authorities determine whether an initiative had the desired effect on the market.

Of these three priorities, perhaps none is more important than providing real-time intelligence and information about drug markets. To evaluate the success of counterdrug programs, policy makers need detailed information about the market's reaction to any counterdrug initiative. Not only does this information help counterdrug authorities gauge the success of a specific initiative, but it helps government officials formulate future initiatives based on the resulting impact on the market. Critical information that helps evaluate changes in illicit drug markets includes the price and purity of drugs throughout the distribution chain, a transport crew's wages, overall costs of various types of transport operations, and required amount of deposit for a drug trafficker to purchase bulk quantities of drugs.

Often during the course of an investigation of a specific trafficker, critical operational information related to other traffickers and their operations is uncovered. To disrupt the illicit drug market on a national basis, this informa-

tion must be extracted from open case files, pushed upward for further analysis and dissemination, fused with other national intelligence, and used to drive counterdrug operations.

Such exacting systemic requirements can only be met by establishing intelligence structures and protocols for the rapid sharing of critical information. The counterdrug intelligence structure is evolving rapidly to better meet the shifting drug trafficking threat and to adjust to substantial changes in the structure of the US Government. Narcotics specific intelligence initiatives are refocusing to ensure that our assets and capabilities are used to maximum effect.

Drug control agencies are leveraging their enforcement and intelligence capabilities against CPOTs—Consolidated Priority Organizations Targets—considered the highest level of criminal organizations in the drug trade. Efforts to disrupt and dismantle CPOT organizations are primarily accomplished through multiagency investigations coordinated by Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) agencies. Of the 45 CPOTs identified in FY 2005, 39 (87 percent) have been successfully indicted and 15 (33 percent) have been arrested. In three years, we have dismantled 20 organizations while severely disrupting an additional 11. The heads of 36 CPOT organizations—nearly 51 percent of the total CPOTs—have been arrested. In addition, in the past three years, the US Government has identified 70 major trafficking organizations, 13 of which have links to terrorist organizations, and added them to the CPOT list.

The OCDETF Fusion Center (OFC), when it reaches its initial operating capability in 2006, will significantly enhance law enforcement's ability to "connect the dots" and increase the flow of investigative information to the field. OFC is an intelligence center designed to collect, store, and analyze relevant all-source drug and related financial investigative information. The center will support multijurisdictional investigations focused on the disruption and dismantlement of significant drug trafficking and money-laundering enterprises. OFC, which is composed of nine agencies, is developing a comprehensive data warehouse that will give access to investigative drug and financial information to OCDETF member agencies and other

intelligence centers. Analysts at the center will use sophisticated link analysis tools to comprehensively analyze information and develop intelligence products and leads that can be used by OCDETF member agencies.

US law enforcement has recognized that predictive intelligence is the key to effective and efficient targeting and enforcement. Intelligence improvements are part of DEA-wide efforts to use intelligence to identify strategic targets whose arrest will have a maximum effect on the drug market. Expanded intelligence capabilities generate predictive intelligence, identifying trends and vulnerabilities against which limited enforcement resources can be directed. DEA's intelligence program provides dedicated analytical support to DEA investigations, programs, and operations worldwide. Significant initiatives include using DEA reports officers to extract information from DEA case files and disseminating that information by cable to the intelligence community, implementing a centralized collection management system that will determine collection priorities and task collection assets and identify collection gaps, and expanding career management and training opportunities for analysts.

DEA used enhanced intelligence capabilities in the execution of *Operation All Inclusive* in Central America. *Operation All Inclusive* was a multiagency US Government and host country effort that involved predictive intelligence modeling, thorough analytic assessment of trafficker vulnerabilities, and unprecedented intelligence sharing, planning, and operational collaboration. Overall, this cooperative, interagency effort had a significant effect. Intelligence clearly identified the disruption of maritime transportation operations. *Operation All Inclusive* contributed to drug seizures, including many in the Transit Zone by Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-South), and \$15.2 million in bulk currency shipments.

DEA is refocusing El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) capabilities to enhance its efforts at predictive intelligence. EPIC is composed of 15 Federal agencies, which combine their intelligence and databases to provide wide-ranging investigative support. EPIC maintains several state-of-the-art programs that support law enforcement operations along the southwest border. Technological advances in

information sharing in the past two years and EPIC's 24/7 watch operation gives law enforcement tactical information related to the border 24 hours a day. EPIC is also developing its Open Connectivity Project that will provide its Federal, state, and local partners with online access to EPIC's research and analytical products, around the clock

support, and National Seizure System data. The project will be highly secure, thus enabling law enforcement agencies to coordinate joint operations and investigations safely and enhancing officer/personnel safety. It will also provide analysts with sophisticated Geospatial Information System technology.

Disrupting Chicago's Violent Drug Gangs

In Chicago, street gangs, narcotics, and violent crime are inextricably intertwined. The Chicago Police Department (CPD) is currently tracking 68 active street gangs comprised of more than 500 factions with a total membership estimated at 68,000 in Chicago. The four major



Chicago street gangs—the Gangster Disciples, Latin Kings, Black Disciples, and Vice Lords—are present in more than half the states in the country. Street gangs control almost all of the local distribution of narcotics because of their sophisticated organizational structures, propensity for violence, and large membership. In 2003, almost 50 percent of all homicides in Chicago were street-gang or narcotics related.

The CPD and DEA have developed a multifaceted strategy to combat street gangs and attendant drug dealing and violence. The CPD has developed innovative operations with the assistance of various agencies, including the US Attorney's Office; Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; the FBI; Internal Revenue Service (IRS); Housing and Urban Development; Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); Federal Communications Commission; Cook County States Attorney; Illinois Department of Corrections; and Chicago High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA).

In one example, participating local, state, and Federal agencies meet monthly to share information to target Main 21 gang members. The Main 21 list consists of gang leaders and members who exert significant influence over their membership and the community in the areas of gang activity, drug distribution, and violence. The meetings determine which participating agency has the best opportunity to successfully pursue a criminal case against a list member.

Most of the drugs distributed in Chicago are sold in open-air drug markets, which are operated by street gangs throughout the city. Targeted operations have been developed to clamp down on street gangs and open-air drug markets via physical and video surveillance, undercover buys, court-approved eavesdropping devices, and other investigative tools. Known as Street Corner Conspiracies, the number of operations has increased from 20 in 2003 to more than 50 in 2005. One example, *Operation Daytrader*, targeted a gang called the Mafia Insane Vice Lords. The operation used 15 wires over a two-year period, which resulted in identification of the sources of supply for heroin and cocaine sold by the group. The operation led to 49 Federal and 53 state indictments.

Street Corner Conspiracies uses a full range of law enforcement techniques to address open-air drug markets. Reverse sting missions, where undercover officers pretend to be drug dealers at an open-air drug market, have led to significant arrests and vehicle seizures. Pole-mounted cameras have been installed to monitor strategic street corners and properties owned by the Chicago Housing Authority. The cameras have dramatically reduced drug dealing and violence at those locations. Also, members of the CPD Deployment Operations Center analyze information generated from Street Corner Conspiracies to strategically deploy manpower and resources. The resulting presence of police manpower often reduces or eliminates potential gang/drug activity and/or violence in targeted areas of the city. IRS investigators have joined the CPD and other agencies in identifying and seizing the assets of gang members, including a radio station used to advertise locations to buy narcotics, several buildings, numerous luxury vehicles, jewelry, and substantial amounts of cash. The CPD has concentrated its efforts to seize weapons, which has resulted in Chicago leading other major cities in the seizure of guns.

The aforementioned operations have resulted in a 39 percent reduction in aggravated batteries with firearms and a 25 percent reduction in homicides in Chicago over a two-year period. Also, there have been a substantial number of arrests for narcotic violations and numerous disruptions of drug trafficking organizations. The Chicago strategy can be used as a model for other cities seeking ways to cope with street gangs, drugs, and violence.

A critical need to facilitate information sharing through electronic connectivity and automation continues to exist among Federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies. To meet this challenge, DEA, HIDTA, and their state and local partners have created an interagency committee to develop a National Virtual Pointer System (NVPS). NVPS connects existing Federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement investigative systems to eliminate the possibility that multiple law enforcement organizations' activities could conflict in investigating and arresting the same criminal or criminal organization and allows for sharing of vital intelligence about the target. NVPS enables participating agencies to exchange target information through a single point of entry using a "sensitive but unclassified" network. NVPS established a single format for information sharing that lets participating systems communicate with many dissimilar systems.

Another effort to coordinate law enforcement efforts is *COBIJA*, which means "blanket" in Spanish. *COBIJA* is a coordinated planning effort managed by the Arizona Partnership of the Southwest Border HIDTA to synchronize local, tribal, state, and Federal highway interdiction operations through planning, information sharing, and intelligence generation. It establishes a mechanism that enhances operational coordination/cooperation and information/intelligence sharing throughout the United States. For example, *COBIJA* provides intelligence to field enforcement personnel to disrupt/dismantle smuggling routes/organizations, criminal enterprise activities, and other potential threats. The *COBIJA* planning effort has three components: an operational planning conference (attended by local, state, tribal, and Federal law enforcement task force participants) where agencies develop coordinated interdiction operations plans; an operational period, where dates are determined by an intelligence analysis process (and are usually two to six weeks long); and an after-action review process, where every participant has the opportunity to share lessons learned. The last *COBIJA* meeting took place in spring 2005 where more than 600 law enforcement personnel representing 45 states attended and provided written coordinated highway interdiction plans that resulted in 5,000 seizure incidents, \$37 million seized, more than 500,000 pounds of illicit drugs

seized, and 7,000 subjects arrested. Efforts are under way to regionalize this concept in selected areas of the United States, enhancing *COBIJA*'s focus on regional drug threats.

Financial Attack

The lure of making large sums of cash is the main motivation that drives drug trafficking. In our local communities, young adults begin selling narcotics because they see it as a quick way to earn a lot of money. Foreign drug traffickers ruthlessly fight their way to the top of criminal organizations for the monetary rewards and the power that it buys. In addition, numerous foreign terrorist organizations worldwide finance their terrorist operations through drug trafficking.

Because the drug trade is a profit-making business, a balance of cost versus reward and risk comes into play. Upsetting this balance offers the possibility of damaging the entire drug trade. Without sufficient funds, drug trafficking organizations' efforts to produce, purchase, and distribute drugs are seriously impaired. Major drug trafficking organizations have significant expenses that must be paid regardless of the income generated. Not being able to promptly pay these expenses will undermine a drug trafficking organization's ability to continue its business. Lack of money also diminishes organizations' ability to corrupt local and national governments and influence others.

Federal agencies are strategically refocusing their resources to attack the financial infrastructure of drug trafficking organizations. A strong ally in this attack is the financial sector of our economy, which has been effectively keeping most illegal funds out of our banking system. Drug trafficking organizations are being forced to ship narcotics proceeds in bulk to foreign countries rather than deposit the funds directly into the US banking system. The bulk and weight of the illicit proceeds that must be returned to the trafficking organizations vastly outweigh the drugs themselves and represent a significant vulnerability of drug trafficking organizations. Drug trafficking organizations are also resorting to the Colombian Black Market Peso Exchange to move their drug proceeds to Colombia. The United States is working with the Colombian

Government along with the financial sector to disrupt and dismantle this system, as well as with Mexican authorities to seize bulk cash smuggled into Mexico.

To accomplish this strategy, the OFC, as referenced in the intelligence section above, is being established. Within the next year, the OFC should be fully operational and capable of analyzing massive amounts of intelligence concerning the financial operations of drug trafficking organizations. In addition, DEA has initiated Financial Investigative Teams (FITs) in all domestic field division offices to attack drug finances. Internationally, DEA has initiated FITs in Colombia and Thailand and increased the number of agents who specialize in financial investigations in Mexico. DEA, ICE, and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agents are training and working with vetted units in many foreign countries to intercept both narcotics and narcotics money. Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigations Division (IRS-CID) and DEA have initiated a joint Wire Remitter Project to identify illegal money that is transmitted by wire service businesses. Identifying the sender and recipient of illegal funds will help us better understand and target the illegal financial infrastructure of drug trafficking organizations.

ICE, IRS-CID, and DEA have initiated Bulk Currency Initiatives to identify, intercept, and seize narcotics proceeds. Federal law enforcement agencies working together with state and local law enforcement in Operations Pipeline, Convoy, and Jetway continue to show improvements in attacking the bulk currency and monetary instrument shipments of drug trafficking organizations. DEA has exploited the intelligence gleaned from drug and bulk currency interdictions to identify, investigate, and dismantle five drug and currency transportation organizations linked to CPOT organizations. In the future, ICE and CBP intend to expand their use of dedicated outbound currency interdiction teams to sharply increase border-area cash seizures.

The United States is making progress in disrupting the market by seizing the profits of drug trafficking. During 2002, law enforcement agencies seized more than \$696.3 million just in currency and monetary instruments that were destined for foreign drug trafficking organizations.

In 2004, that amount increased to more than \$785.7 million, not including the value of assets seized or currency seized by state and local law enforcement. The new initiatives highlighted above will substantially increase the seizure of trafficker assets and further disrupt the operation of drug trafficking organizations.


Transit Zone Interdiction

Transit Zone interdiction accounted for the removal of hundreds of tons of cocaine from the market in 2005 (see *Increasing Transit Zone Cocaine Seizures*). Large seizures denied traffickers significant profits from selling bulk quantities of cocaine. They also prevented millions of dollars in illegal proceeds from returning to Colombia.

For the third straight year, joint service, interagency, and multinational forces in the Transit Zone, under the able coordination of JIATF-South, seized and disrupted a record amount of cocaine (see *Making a Difference in the Transit Zone*). Transit Zone seizures and disruptions in 2005 amounted to 254 metric tons, compared to 219 metric tons in 2004 and 176 metric tons in 2003. In 2005, JIATF-South and allies air and maritime assets interdicted an impressive 66 go-fasts and 49 fishing vessels loaded with cocaine. During August 2005 alone, JIATF-South removed 45 metric tons of cocaine destined for US markets, stopping seven smuggler go-fasts, a similar number of trafficker fishing vessels, and two motor vessels.

Key to these successes is the collection and dissemination of actionable intelligence regarding maritime cocaine shipments. Operation Panama Express, an OCDETF initiative managed jointly by FBI, DEA, ICE, Coast Guard, and JIATF-South has greatly expanded interdiction-related intelligence. Since its inception in February 2000, Operation Panama Express has directly contributed to the seizure of more than 480 metric tons of cocaine and the arrest of over 1,000 individuals.

As expected, drug traffickers attempted to adapt to US interdiction efforts. Trafficker fishing-vessel operations moved farther out in the Pacific, in the area of the Galapagos Islands, and Ecuador was used more often as a



logistical hub for cocaine deliveries. Traffickers continued to launch cocaine-laden speedboats from the Colombian north coast to points along Central America and Mexico and increased their use of fishing vessels in the Caribbean.

JIATF-South, which integrates the interdiction efforts of US law enforcement and intelligence agencies with the Department of Defense, was a model of interagency coordination and efficiency in 2005. Of particular significance is JIATF-South's close working relationship with numerous allied countries—11 countries from South America and Europe have liaison officers at JIATF-South—which is critical for the synchronization of regional operations. As a result, allies such as the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Spain, and France also seized record-breaking amounts of European-bound cocaine in the eastern Caribbean and the Atlantic Ocean in 2005—68 metric tons of cocaine, compared to 38 metric tons in 2004.

Making a Difference in the Transit Zone – The Case of USCGC *HAMILTON*

For five weeks during the summer of 2005, the US Coast Guard Cutter *Hamilton* and its MH-68 helicopter dominated the eastern Pacific Ocean, an area as large as the United States, and wreaked havoc on cocaine-laden speedboats and fishing vessels. The *Hamilton* interdicted four cocaine-laden vessels, seizing an impressive 13 metric tons of cocaine, valued at almost \$1 billion, and put 22 drug traffickers out of business.

The hunt began on August 11, 2005, when the *Hamilton*, based on a tip from JIATF-South, searched for a trafficker speedboat in the remote areas north of the Galapagos Islands. Shortly after nightfall, the *Hamilton* sighted a fast-moving target on the ship's fire control radar. Maneuvering undetected, the *Hamilton* launched the cutter's over-the-horizon small boats and rushed the target from different directions. Still undetected, and less than 100 yards from the target, both small boats lit up the vessel and announced their presence. The completely surprised speedboat crew immediately surrendered, and the *Hamilton* seized 2.3 metric tons of cocaine and five drug smugglers.

After a short stop to refuel and transfer detainees, the *Hamilton* resumed the search on August 17 for another smuggler speedboat

some 300 miles west of Ecuador. Shortly before sunset, the *Hamilton* again spied a fast-moving target on radar and launched its helicopter. Vectoring in on the fleeing speedboat, the helicopter fired warning shots and one round of disabling fire. The disabling fire stopped the speedboat dead in its tracks. The *Hamilton* added another 2.4 metric tons of cocaine to its total plus four traffickers.

A few weeks later, on September 17, the *Hamilton*, operating on another tip from JIATF-South, was on patrol several hundred miles off a well-known West Coast departure point for Colombian drug trafficking vessels. After covertly monitoring a suspicious radar contact throughout the night, the *Hamilton's* helicopter identified the target as the Colombian fishing vessel *Danny Ivan*. When darkness fell, the *Hamilton's* boarding team conducted a surprise short-notice boarding, rapidly securing the vessel before the traffickers were able to scuttle it. The boarding team discovered 6.1 metric tons of cocaine and detained nine drug smugglers.

Barely two days later, *Hamilton* and a US Navy ship, assisted by a Customs and Border Protection maritime patrol aircraft, cooperated in the pursuit of another trafficker speedboat some 250 miles from the Ecuadorian-Colombian border. *Hamilton* launched its helicopter, and, after a few warning shots, the traffickers surrendered. The *Hamilton's* haul was another 2.2 metric tons of cocaine and four smugglers. The *Hamilton* thus ended one of the most successful counterdrug deployments in US Coast Guard history.

Transit Zone interdiction is a team effort that relies on the successful execution of several steps in an interdiction continuum, including the collection and dissemination of actionable intelligence, the detection and monitoring of suspect vessels, and the physical interdiction of those vessels. A key player in the interdiction continuum, and one of the principal factors behind the record-breaking cocaine seizures, is the US Coast Guard's employment of armed helicopters, commonly referred to as HITRON (Helicopter Interdiction Tactical Squadron). Flying at 140 knots, these helicopters easily outrun the fastest trafficker speedboat. Armed with laser-sighted .50-caliber sniper rifles, they are capable of convincing even the most desperate smuggling crew that it is in their best interest to surrender. In FY 2005, HITRON interdicted 30 trafficker speedboats, 12 of them at night, capturing an impressive 50 metric tons of cocaine. These results should further improve as the United Kingdom, using US Coast Guard tactics, training, and procedures, has recently implemented Airborne Use of Force (AUF) capabilities and the US Navy prepares to employ armed helicopters against drug traffickers in 2006.

Record seizures are hurting traffickers, eroding their profits and destabilizing the transportation sector of the cocaine industry. However, as long as fishing-vessel and speedboat drug deliveries are still getting past our defenses in the Transit Zone, more work has to be done. As the traffickers modify their strategy, we will continue to adapt and forge new initiatives that will have an even greater impact on the illicit drug market. We will also continue working with our partner nations in the Source and Transit Zones to build their own capacity to detect, monitor, and interdict narcotics.

Mexico and the Southwest Border Challenge

The harsh climate, vast geography, and sparse population of the American southwest have long challenged law enforcement along the roughly 2,000-mile border with Mexico. In addition to the 33 legitimate crossing points, the border includes hundreds of miles of open desert, rugged mountains, and the Rio Grande River, providing an ideal environment for cross-border criminal activity. Drug traffickers exploit the border in two directions, smuggling drugs from Mexico into the United States and moving billions of dollars in illicit drug profits from the United States back into Mexico. This trafficking is conducted by using hidden compartments in cars and trucks, tunnels and aqueducts, backpackers on foot, light-weight aircraft and gliders, all-terrain vehicles, package delivery services, motorized launches, and even rafts floating across the Rio Grande. The same transportation networks that smuggle drugs across the border are also capable of bringing terrorists or weapons of mass destruction into our Nation.

Because the US Government's counterdrug, counterterrorism, and immigration enforcement missions are interrelated, improved counterdrug efforts will also enhance border security. In February 2005, the Homeland Security Advisor directed the development of a strategy to address the drug threat to the southwest border. Interagency efforts, at the time of this writing, are culminating in a coordinated *National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy* that will identify key strategic objectives and provide specific recommendations to address the illicit narcotics threat and significantly improve overall interdiction efforts along the southwest border.



Most illicit drugs that enter the United States are smuggled across the US-Mexican border. Mexico produces the most heroin and foreign-sourced marijuana in the Western Hemisphere and is the primary transit route for US-bound cocaine. Mexican drug trafficking organizations are also increasingly involved in the production of methamphetamine consumed in the United States.

Responding to this challenge requires intense effort by both the United States and Mexico.

During the presidency of Vicente Fox, Mexico has demonstrated its commitment to countering the drug threat through its large-scale opium poppy and marijuana eradication programs. The Mexican Army and the Attorney General's Office conduct eradication operations, and these programs consistently kill at least 80 percent of the opium poppy and marijuana crop each year.

This commitment to effective eradication is clearly reflected in its impact on Mexican opium poppy cultivation. In 2004, Mexico eradicated nearly 16,000 hectares of opium poppy, causing cultivation to drop 27 percent, from 4,800 hectares in 2003 to 3,500 hectares in 2004. Potential heroin production in Mexico fell by 25 percent over the same period, from 12 metric tons in 2003 to 9 metric tons in 2004.

Mexico's commitment to eradication has reduced the country's marijuana cultivation (see *Mexican Annual Marijuana Eradication Totals*). As a result of the eradication of 30,836 hectares of marijuana in 2004, marijuana cultivation fell 23 percent, from 7,500 hectares in 2003 to 5,800 hectares in 2004. Marijuana potential production, although still high by historical standards, fell from 13,400 metric tons in 2003 to an estimated 10,400 metric tons in 2004. As of November 2005, the Mexican Government reported that it had eradicated 30,883 hectares. The impact of these



eradication efforts is amplified by the roughly 2,000 additional metric tons of marijuana that Mexico seizes annually.

Mexico's efforts against marijuana trafficking cause damage to an extremely profitable business. The US Government estimates that Mexican traffickers receive more than \$13.8 billion in revenue from illicit-drug sales to the United States; 61 percent of that revenue, or \$8.5 billion, is directly tied to marijuana export sales. Marijuana has become the primary revenue source for Mexican drug trafficking organizations, eclipsing the potential revenue from cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine combined (see *Estimated Revenue for Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations*).

Mexico has also improved the investigative and analytic capabilities of its premier Federal law enforcement institutions. The Federal Investigative Agency (AFI) and the National Center for Analysis, Planning, and Intelligence Against Organized Crime (CENAPI) of the Attorney General's Office are more capable than they were before the Fox Administration. This progress was apparent in 2004, with the capture of five senior members of the Arellano Felix Organization, a senior operator of the Ismael Zambada Organization, two lieutenants of the Gulf Cartel, and Guatemalan kingpin Otto Roberto Herrera-García.

Attacking the Lucrative Marijuana Trade at Home

Domestic production of marijuana is not a new threat, but in recent years, the size and sophistication of domestic grow operations has increased. This is largely because of Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) operating within the United States. Mexican groups operating in the United States have several advantages, including reduced chance of seizure during transit of drugs across the border, convenient access to local drug markets, and the immense profitability of domestically grown marijuana.

Using labor smuggled across the border, Mexican criminal groups establish and maintain large marijuana cultivation operations on US public and private lands. Because the cultivation operations are protected both by booby traps and armed guards, they pose a significant risk to local residents, park visitors, and law enforcement officials. New cultivation techniques, including careful use of fertilizer and irrigation, have been perfected to produce a larger, more potent outdoor marijuana crop with an increased street value. Once harvested, the marijuana is quickly delivered to trafficking networks within the United States, reducing the cost of transportation and the potential risk of seizure.

Considering a typical outdoor crop of 5,000 plants, at \$4,000 per pound of sinsemilla, a trafficker can return more than \$20 million in a single outdoor season. In 2005, law enforcement seized more domestically cultivated marijuana in the San Diego region than they seized crossing the San Diego region's border points of entry. The Administration has responded to this threat by reorganizing and increasing our eradication initiatives.

For the 2005 eradication season, approximately 5.7 million marijuana plants were eradicated within the United States. This is a million plant increase over 2004. California led the way, with the expected eradication of more than 3 million plants, followed by 736,000 plants in Kentucky, 463,000 plants in Tennessee, and 251,000 plants in Hawaii. The Forest Service and Department of Interior combined eradicated an estimated 1.6 million plants during the 2005 eradication season. Eighty percent of these plants were eradicated from public lands in California, Kentucky, Tennessee, Arizona, Arkansas, Washington, and Oregon.

In an effort to vigorously target, disrupt, and dismantle large-scale marijuana cultivation operations, ONDCP and DEA, in conjunction with other Federal, state, and local agencies, have identified the top

seven states where illicit marijuana cultivation frequently takes place. These seven states, referred to as the Marijuana Seven (M7) include California, Oregon, Washington, Hawaii, Kentucky, Tennessee, and West Virginia. Based on historical performance measures, ONDCP and DEA shifted funding priorities at the start of the 2005 eradication season to focus on these states. With the additional resources made available, the M7 states eradicated 4.7 million plants in 2005, an increase of 1.9 million over 2004 totals. Because of the success achieved by the M7 states, this project will be expanded to include other selected states.

In addition to reallocating funds, DEA and HIDTA were responsible for numerous investigations that targeted both national and international DTOs that were using Federal, state, and local public lands to cultivate large quantities of marijuana. Several examples of these investigations are highlighted below.

DEA supported two significant investigations, one of which was designated an OCDEF case. The OCDEF and HIDTA investigation, known as *Operation Prairie Dog*, targeted a sizable outdoor growing operation in eastern Oregon. The case culminated in the seizure of more than 15,000 marijuana plants in six separate grow sites. Seven defendants were arrested, three of which were armed at the time of their arrest. Another case originated in Gila County, Arizona, on land owned and controlled by the US Forest Service. Hunters exploring the area came on an outdoor grow tended by armed Mexican nationals. Gunfire was exchanged, but no injuries were reported. The hunters reported their encounter with county and Federal officials. A subsequent search of the area yielded approximately 5,500 marijuana plants and a high-powered rifle.

Agents from the Central Valley California HIDTA Fresno Marijuana Task Force (FMTF), with the assistance of multiple law enforcement agencies, concluded a 17-month investigation into the large-scale cultivation and distribution of marijuana by the Oscar Rosales organization. FMTF agents served five search warrants and two Federal arrest warrants in Fresno and Madera Counties. Agents located two indoor and one outdoor marijuana garden in Fresno County. In Madera County, agents served three search warrants and located one indoor and one outdoor marijuana garden. Each garden was cultivating approximately 40 plants. Agents also seized 14 weapons at these locations and multiple pounds of marijuana processed for sale. Based on both the cultivated marijuana and processed marijuana, agents estimated the seizure to be worth approximately \$495,000.

Nonetheless, the Fox Administration still faces significant challenges. Mexican trafficking organizations have generated unprecedented violence, especially in border cities. Although Mexico has attempted an array of initiatives, it has yet to extradite a major active drug trafficker to the United States. To help overcome these challenges, the United States and Mexico will continue to work to address our shared problem with drug production and trafficking.

Building Afghanistan's Future


The United States is working to ensure that Afghanistan is never again a haven for terrorists, a major opium-producing country, or a source of instability or oppression.

The production and trafficking of narcotics in Afghanistan is a threat to the stability of both Afghanistan and the surrounding region. Recent estimates from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime indicate that 87 percent of the world's illegal opiates are produced in Afghanistan. In addition to all the other nefarious and debilitating consequences of opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, robust drug production contributes to an environment of corruption and of political and economic instability that can foster insurgent and terrorist organizations, thus threatening the democratically elected Afghan Government. Unchecked trafficking and production of narcotics threatens to undermine all of the other achievements that the United States and our allies are working towards in the region. The continued support of counternarcotics efforts must remain an important part of overall US policy in Afghanistan.

The strategy for attacking the economic basis of the drug trade in Afghanistan reinforces other priorities in the US Global War on Terror. We are committed to a counternarcotics strategy that aims to enhance stability in this fledgling democracy by attacking a source of financial and political support for terrorist organizations that threaten the United States and our allies. Our strategic objectives are to (1) build Afghan institutional capacity to sustain the battle against narcotics; (2) assist Afghan authorities to arrest, prosecute, and punish drug traffickers and corrupt Afghan officials; (3) increase the risk and provide economic alternatives to the illegal narcotics trade; and (4)

support Afghan Government efforts to make the narcotics trade culturally unacceptable.

Eliminating the entrenched drug trade and drug-funded corruption requires a long-term and sustained effort, to which Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai has pledged his complete support and commitment. This effort calls for US and other foreign assistance to eliminate this serious threat to both Afghanistan and the international community. Toward this end, working with the Governments of Afghanistan and the United Kingdom, the lead nation for coordinating international counternarcotics support in Afghanistan, we have developed a comprehensive and integrated strategy based on a five-pillar program designed to meet the challenge of narcotics production and trafficking on several fronts. The Public Information pillar aims at galvanizing the Afghan populace to reject opium poppy cultivation and trade. The Alternative Livelihoods pillar, spearheaded by the US Agency for International Development (USAID), seeks to establish economic alternatives to poppy cultivation (see text box: *USAID Alternative Livelihood Program*). The Poppy Elimination Program pillar centers on preventing poppy planting and eradicating fields when prevention is unsuccessful. Our Interdiction pillar seeks to build Afghan capacity to destroy drug labs, seize precursor chemical and opiates, and arrest major traffickers. The Justice Reform pillar assists the Afghan Government in building its



capacity to arrest, prosecute, and punish traffickers and corrupt officials.

Opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan fell 48 percent from 2004 levels to 107,000 hectares in 2005. Potential opium production was estimated at 4,475 metric tons, a 10 percent decrease from 2004. The decrease in potential opium production was lower than the decrease in opium poppy cultivation because exceptionally good precipitation and minimal disease problems contributed to a rebound in opium yields. If the entire opium crop were processed, production results would equate to a potential 526 metric tons of heroin. Cultivation levels appear to have declined in 2005 primarily due to decisions by farmers to grow less poppy rather than through substantial eradication programs.

Although we are encouraged by the decline in poppy cultivation in 2005, we remain vigilant and determined to

rid Afghanistan of the scourge of the opium trade. The overall scope of the drug threat in Afghanistan remains unacceptably high. Building on these results will continue to require enormous political and administrative efforts, and we look forward to working with the Government of Afghanistan to strengthen its ability to combat this dangerous threat.

The United States is also working closely with the United Kingdom to help give Afghan farmers real economic alternatives, support the Afghan central government and governors to discourage cultivation and eradicate poppy fields, strengthen Afghan drug law enforcement, and help Afghanistan establish interdiction programs. The US Government is also working with our Afghan counterparts to build civic institutions and raise public awareness about the serious harm that drugs inflict (see text box: *DEA FAST Efforts in Afghanistan*).

USAID Alternative Livelihoods Program

Providing Economic Alternatives to Opium Poppy

USAID is playing a key role in the struggle against poppy by carrying out a multi year program to provide economic alternatives to poppy production in key drug-producing areas of Afghanistan. The USAID Alternative Livelihoods Program made a vital contribution to the significant crop reduction in 2005 through immediate-impact jobs for more than 45,000 laborers. The Alternative Livelihoods Program also supported agricultural infrastructure projects and planned comprehensive development projects in those provinces with significantly reduced or no poppy grown.

The program provides Afghan farmers with the skills and input they need to increase their farm's productivity and gives Afghan entrepreneurs access to credit to start or expand businesses that buy and add value to products produced on Afghan farms. The construction of a rural infrastructure is also an important component of the program that links rural areas with cities. The Alternative Livelihoods Program consists of four major elements:

1. **Immediate Needs:** Cash for work that provides an immediate alternative source of income to households that are dependent on the opium economy—an income bridge until comprehensive development takes effect.

2. **Comprehensive Development:** Long-term projects that accelerate economic growth, providing jobs and alternatives to poppy cultivation.
3. **High Visibility:** High-visibility projects in provinces not targeted for comprehensive development to show government concern and react to local counternarcotics initiatives to reduce poppy cultivation, e.g., a nationwide seed and fertilizer program launched in fall 2005.
4. **Good Performers Fund:** Sustainable economic development initiatives in provinces where leadership and communities are committed to discourage poppy production and maintain a poppy-free province.

In 2005, the Alternative Livelihoods Program contributed to the decline of opium poppy cultivation in Nangarhar Province, where cultivation was reduced by 95 percent. In Nangarhar, USAID employed approximately 13,000 people daily in 563 villages. More than 560,000 labor-days were paid, equaling approximately US\$2.5 million in wages paid to Afghans. The program cleaned 1,167 km of irrigation canals and constructed 20,750 cubic meters of flood protection walls. USAID is also implementing a longer-term comprehensive program that includes the establishment of a vegetable-processing plant and flour mill, provision of legitimate sources of credit to farmers and businesses, and the promotion of high-value crops. These efforts, supported by and integrated with the other strategy elements, are critical to reaching the goal of eventually eliminating opium poppy from Afghanistan.

DEA FAST Efforts in Afghanistan

Foreign-Deployed Advisory and Support Teams in Support of Afghan Interdiction Operations

The centerpiece of DEA's Afghanistan strategy is the Foreign-Deployed Advisory Support Teams (FAST) program. In direct support of the FY 2005 counternarcotics strategy, DEA trained, equipped, and deployed the FAST concept in Afghanistan, which is designed to identify, target, investigate, disrupt, or dismantle transnational drug trafficking operations in the region. With the assistance of the Department of Defense, DEA's FAST provides training, guidance, and mentoring to its Afghan counterparts, the National Interdiction Unit (NIU), while conducting bilateral investigations aimed at the region's trafficking organizations. The first FAST elements reported to Afghanistan in April 2005. From that time forward, the Kabul Country Office (CO), FAST, and NIU have worked all investigations and operations as one cohesive unit.



One of DEA's principal objectives is to help build up Afghanistan's counterdrug entities, including the Counternarcotics Police–Afghanistan (CNP-A). The NIU within CNP-A currently consists of five groups of 25 officers, all of whom received rigorous counternarcotics enforcement training between September 2004 and September 2005. Since October 2004, 128 NIU officers have graduated from the training program, and 114 are operationally deployed.

FAST consists of five teams, each consisting of five special agents, an Intelligence Research Specialist, two medics, two communications specialists, and a logistics specialist. Future teams will include a chemical diversion investigator. All team members will receive special Department of Defense training. DEA deployed two of these

teams on a 120-day rotation to Afghanistan with the mandate to support the Kabul CO and NIU investigations targeting the command and control of Afghanistan's most significant drug organizations, their operations, and financial underpinnings. Two additional teams deployed in July 2005 for a 120-day rotation. On conclusion of that deployment, the fifth FAST team began its rotation to Afghanistan in November 2005.

Although still in the early stages of operational development, FAST/NIU conducted combined, joint, and independent interdiction operations across Afghanistan with the Afghanistan Special Narcotics Force and CNP-A. Additionally, in September 2005, NIU conducted a three-day simultaneous interdiction operation in the southwestern region of Afghanistan, putting drug traffickers on alert that Afghanistan has the capability to conduct multiple protracted interdiction operations across the country. Reliable sources indicate that traffickers were shifting operational practices because of fear of the interdiction tactics, techniques, and procedures employed by DEA/FAST and NIU. The success of the program is reflected in the statistics for FY 2005:

Total FY 2005 Seizure Statistics

Opium	42.9 metric tons
Heroin	5.5 metric tons
Morphine base.....	220 kg
Hashish	142.4 metric tons
Chemicals.....	9.4 metric tons
Clandestine conversion labs* ...	247
Heroin presses	44
Processing vats	49
Arrested/detained.....	32†

* Opium, morphine base, heroin.

† Includes one extradition to United States.